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eu elections as second order elections 
 
After thirty-five years, nine elections, and an impressive amount of academic lite-
rature, it is common knowledge that European elections are second-order elections. 
Since the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980), the Second Order Election (SOE) 
theory has been tested in the aftermath of each successive election (among others: 
van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 1996; Marsh 1998; Schmitt 2005; Schmitt and Te-
peroglou 2015), and has repeatedly confirmed its effectiveness.  
The main characteristic of a second-order election is to be less salient than a na-
tional Parliamentary election (which is ﬁrst-order), because less is at stake. Howe-
ver, the key difference between other second-order (e.g. local elections) and Euro-
pean elections is that the latter share a key feature with ﬁrst-order elections: they 
are both held at the national level.  
Reif and Schmitt (1980) identify three main distinctive features that mark the 
difference between a national and a European election. Namely, (1) a lower turnout, 
(2) the parties in government will lose votes, and (3) smaller parties will do better 
and bigger parties will do worse. 
Of these three characteristics, lower turnout is the one that is most obviously lin-
ked to the lower saliency of European elections. If little is at stake, why bother ca-
sting a ballot? Building on the assumption that voting in three successive national 
elections creates the habit of voting (Butler and Stokes, 1975; Plutzer, 2002; Fran-
klin, 2004), Franklin and Hobolt (2011) have shown that it is indeed habitual vo-
ters that show up at the EU polls, because EU elections do not sufficiently mobilize 
the non-habitual ones. This partially explains why big parties – and especially par-
ties in government – lose votes (van der Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis 1996; Fer-
rara and Weishaupt 2004; Kousser 2004; Marsh 1998, 2003; Hix and Marsh 2007; 
Reif 1984). In fact, research suggests that voters tend overall to conﬁrm their pre-
ferences at EU elections (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Weber, 2007; Hobolt et 
al.,2009). Big parties and parties in government are generally those that also ma-
nage to mobilize non-habitual voters at national elections. Therefore, low turnout 
will inevitably – and disproportionally – punish them (Franklin and Hobolt 2011; 
Franklin and Hobolt 2015). On top of this, there is evidence that 40% of voters who 
switch party between a national and a European election, go from a big to a small 
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party (Hix and Marsh, 2007). Those who tend to perform consistently better are anti-
EU parties and green parties, whilst socialist parties tend to do worse. This seems 
to be due to a mix of (mostly) protest voting and (very partially) a proper Europe-
an vote (Hix and Marsh, 2007).1 
Regarding issues, these are expected to be more important at EP elections than 
at national elections because the latter engender strategic considerations. Many peo-
ple would rather vote for a party that is likely to have an opportunity to pass its po-
licies into law than to simply vote for the party that is closest to them on their most 
important issues – if that party would be unlikely to actually enact those policies. So 
votes for small parties go along with votes on issues that the voters concerned feel 
strongly about. SOE theory would lead us to expect these to be national issues, but 
there can easily be a pattern of concern for issues felt to have been neglected, for exam-
ple environmental issues. 
Although the volatility of vote preferences might have repercussions on the sta-
bility, and, more in general, on the party system of a country, low levels of turnout 
are more problematic at the EU level. In fact, turnout is widely considered an indi-
rect indicator of legitimacy and quality of democracy (Lijphart 1999; Coppedge et 
al 2011). Therefore, making these elections more salient and actually about Euro-
pe (and not simply a substitute for internal polls of parties’ popularity among voters) 
has been a crucial point both in scholarly discussions and at the political level. For 
example, van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) argued that in order to make elections 
more salient in the eyes of the voters, it was necessary that they would actually fo-
cus on Europe – but this is hard to achieve. An attempt in this sense was the intro-
duction in 2014 of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten. The main idea was to try to rein-
force the link between the President of the Commission and the elections. As Hobolt 
(2014) noticed, this reform did alter the way in which the candidate was selected, 
but did not change the nature of the EU elections (see also Christiansen and Schac-
kleton 2019, in this book). This is of course due to several circumstances, but as Niel-
sen and Franklin (2017) argue, the core problem lies in the fact that even with the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten, the 2014 EU elections failed “to achieve the 
objectives that elections are supposed to achieve: failing to provide direct policy con-
sequences for the voice of people” (p. 9). The real power does not lie in the Com-
mission, but in the European Council and in the club of EU Prime Ministers. Therefore, 
linking the elections to the President of the Commission did not ignite a process that 
would ﬁnally instate the democratic linkage between the EU Parliament and the EU's 
citizens. For these reasons Nielsen and Franklin (2017) argue that EU elections not 
only are second-order – they are also second-rate. If a second-order election lacks sa-
liency, a second-rate election lacks a policy linkage, as the connection between the 
1. It should be born in mind that SOE theory sees EP elections as displaying pale reflections of 
national political processes and concerns. It follows that if national politics show no interest 
in European matters that EP elections will show no such interest either. But the discovery of 
European issue concerns at EP eletions does not in itself run counter to SOE theory if those 
European issues have become evident in the national politics of the countries concerned.
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voters’ choices and policies that will be produced is missing. It could be argued that 
it is actually this second-rate nature that made the EU elections inevitably second-
order in the eyes of national electorates. 
 
contextual influences on ep election turnout 
 
Though turnout at EP elections is invariably low, the level of turnout does fluctua-
te from one EP election to the next, tempting commentators to try to interpret the-
se fluctuations in terms of support for or opposition to the EU or its European Par-
liament. Franklin (2001) argued, with a wealth of supportive evidence, that varia-
tions in EP election turnout could be almost entirely explained on the basis of a small 
number of contextual (or structural) factors, leaving little room for any sort of ver-
dict on the EU or its Parliament. 
First, many European Parliament elections have evidently been subject to a “ﬁrst 
election boost”. Like the ﬁrst elections held in many circumstances (Kostelka 
2017), turnout was elevated at each 20th century EP election that was a ﬁrst-time 
event: the ﬁrst EP election ever held (to the Parliament of 1979); the ﬁrst EP elec-
tion held in the Southern Enlargement countries (Spain and Portugal) to the Par-
liament elected in 1984, and the ﬁrst election held in the Northern Enlargement coun-
tries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) to the Parliament elected in 1994. Only in the 
21st Century did there appear to be no “ﬁrst election boost”, at the ﬁrst EP election 
held in Eastern Enlargement countries. But various reasons can be adduced to ex-
plain this failure of a boost to appear (in particular, electoral fatigue at elections that 
followed closely on referendum campaigns to ratify membership in the EU). 
Second, European Parliament elections occur at different times in the national 
election cycles of member countries. This varies the low importance bestowed on them, 
increasing that low importance somewhat when these elections take place shortly 
before a national parliamentary election, meaning that they can be viewed as 'ba-
rometers' of national party standings (Eijk and Franklin 1996). The contrary is also 
true. When held in the immediate aftermath of national elections, EP elections have 
less importance than average because a better barometer of national party standings 
already exists in the results of that recent national election. 
Third, EP elections are subject to composition effects, as repeated enlargements 
change the EU's complexion by adding countries in which turnout is higher or lower 
than the average turnout of the existing EU member states. In particular, the EU star-
ted out with four members in which electoral participation was compulsory (Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg – 40 percent of then member countries). Over time, 
however, Italy removed its compulsion to vote and only one of the 28 new member 
countries, Cyprus, was a compulsory voting country. Given the 37-percentage-point 
effect of compulsory voting on turnout at EP elections shown in the appendix to this 
chapter, the progres-sively smaller proportion of countries exhibiting this effect would 
naturally cause turnout to decline. 
Finally, a new contextual effect has recently become apparent, also having to do 
with compulsory voting. It has been well-established that when compulsory voting 
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is abolished this initiates a long process of downward turnout adjustment as those who 
learned their voting habits under the compulsory regime retain those high-level tur-
nout habits even as new voters fail to acquire the habit of voting at the same high le-
vel. Over the next ﬁfty years, generational replacement slowly reduces the level of tur-
nout to the level of those who had never known a compulsion to vote (Franklin 2004). 
This pattern of behavior applies to countries that had enforced the compulsion with 
sanctions that were apparent, even if not potent (as in Italy). But a number of coun-
tries have compulsory voting laws on the books that are not enforced. In such coun-
tries turnout was high when they acceded to to the EU, even if not as high as in coun-
tries where the compulsion was enforced. Two such countries are Greece and Cyprus, 
both EU member states. What has become apparent in the years since Cyprus beca-
me an EU member is that it has suffered a decline in turnout that looks very like a de-
cline that had recently become apparent in Greece (a decline that had initially been 
masked by the timing of Greece’s second and third EP elections, very close to the next 
national election in each case). The implication is that, in both Greece and Cyprus, 
elections to the EP in a country with un-enforced compulsory voting behave like elec-
tions at which the compulsion has been abolished. It seems that a symbolic compul-
sion is not potent at an election with no apparent purpose. This realization provides 
us with a group of three countries (Cyprus, Greece, and Italy) in which turnout at EP 
elections is in decline for a quasi-structural reason. For Greece and Cyprus this de-
cline started at their second EP elections; for Italy it started at the ﬁrst election after 
compulsory voting was abolished there, in 1994. A ﬁnal country behaves as though 
it were a member of this group. In Malta there was never a compulsion to vote, but 
turnout in years leading up to EU acces-sion was as high as in compulsory voting coun-
tries (Hirczy 1995; Franklin 2004). It seems that an initially widespread habit of vo-
ting responds to the experience of EP elections in the same way regardless of the sour-
ce of that habit, so long as a compulsion to vote is not enforced. 
  
Figure 1. Turnout by different groups of EP-voting countries over time 
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The four contextual effects just listed deﬁne four types of turnout evolution that 
different groups of countries should exhibit at predictable times during the course 
of their individual histories of EP election participation, giving the patterns shown 
in Figure 1. The ﬁgure distinguishes between the ten countries that participated in 
all EP elections (“Original”) and those that acceeded at different times thereafter (“Sou-
thern enlargement”, “Northern enlargement”, “Eastern enlargement”) while also di-
stinguishing, among original EP voting countries, between those that had enforced 
compulsory voting throughout and those that never had compulsory voting. Addi-
tionally, we include a trace for countries with initially high turnout but no enforced 
compulsion to vote. At early EP elections this trace contains Greece and Italy, but tho-
se countries are joined by Cyprus and Malta in 2004. 
The graph shows clearly the ﬁrst election boost enjoyed by southern and northern 
enlargement countries (that boost is less obvious for original non-compulsory vo-
ting countries, but can still be discerned; it is absent for Eastern enlargement coun-
tries). The graph also shows a massive turnout decline from 1994 onwards among 
countries with initially high turnout but no enforced compulsion to vote. Indeed, tur-
nout for all these different groups of countries appears to converge over time. For 
southern and northern enlargement countries this convergence is complete by the 
time of their second EP elections, after which variations in turnout are due to variations 
in election timing (see appendix). For West European countries (other than those 
with enforced compulsory voting) it is as though they had a “natural” level of tur-
nout at EP elections that was rapidly approached with the passage of time, whate-
ver their initial turnout level. Eastern enlargement countries have lower turnout over 
the entire span of their membership in the EU, producing a gap that appears rather 
constant over time as their turnout ﬂuctuates more or less in step with that of the 
other non-compulsory voting countries. 
Just one major anomaly remains to be mentioned. There is an uptick in turnout 
at the end of the series that applies to all EU member countries excepting only the 
countries with some type of com-pulsory or quasi-compulsory voting (in both of which 
traces, however, the rate of turout decline seems to reﬂect the same anomaly). An 
important question attends that anomaly. Is it just a ﬂuctu-ation, such as those we 
see for particular groups of countries in particular years – ﬂuctuations that may be 
largely the result of variations in the timing of elections for different groups? The 
pattern of turnout change in 2019 suggests an effect felt in common across all groups 
of countries, which could hardly be the result of peculiarities of election timing sin-
ce such timing effects are country-speciﬁc. 
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Figure 2. Actual turnout at EP elections and turnout predicted by the structural model 
We can verify the supposition that the 2019 turnout uptick was not due to fac-
tors included in the structural model if we use that model (see appendix, Table A) 
to predict the 2019 turnout outcome and compare the predicted outcome with the 
actual outcome. Indeed, we can do even better, predicting the turnout outcome for 
each year using the same structural model so that we can see to what extent predictions 
match outcomes over the whole sequence of EP elections. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, actual turnout is quite well predicted by the structural 
model, even in 2019. Certainly the structural model does a good job of explaining 
the overall decline in turnout over the whole sequence of elections. And, although 
the ﬁt of predicted to actual turnout was better in EP elections from 1989 to 2014, 
that ﬁt is still pretty good in 2019. What is not good is the the ﬁt of trend in predic-
ted turnout to trend in actual turnout. The EP election of 2019 is the only one in which 
the trend in turnout since the previous election is wrongly predicted in terms of sign 
(positive instead of negative), and the error is huge. Effectively the ﬁt of change in 
predicted turnout to change in actual turnout is zero in 2019.  
So 2019 proves to be quite remarkable in terms of turnout – the ﬁrst election in 
a sequence of 8 successive EP elections where the evolution of turnout since the pre-
vious election diverged com-pletely from what would have been expected on the ba-
sis of structural factors. In our statistical appendix we “explain” this divergence by me-
ans of what statisticians call a “dummy variable”. Usu-ally such variables are poorly 
named, since they are used to indicate well-known factors that are associated with 
speciﬁc cases. In this instance the word “dummy” is unusually appropriate, how-ever. 
The variable indicates only the date when an otherwise unexplicated shock was felt. 
Since the effect is not based on any structural factor yet known to scholars, the 
uptick in 2019 could be due to absolutely anything, and commentators will no doubt 
make hay attributing to it theories concocted for the occasion. Our own guess is that 
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citizens of all member states have been shocked by the Brexit spectacle (including 
citizens of Britain itself), and that a new appreciation of the importance of EP elec-
tions has been the result. But there is no way in which we can conﬁrm that guess with 
data available to us at the time of writing. 
Findings regarding turnout also have implications for other aspects of second or-
der election theory, to which we now turn. 
 
second-order effects on ep party support 
 
The second order theory expects parties to gain votes if they are small parties that 
are not members of the government of the day. However, the theory is not explicit 
about when these gains should occur. An important implication of our structural mo-
del's findings is that any gains in vote share made by small parties should occur to-
wards the start of the electoral cycle, which is when most additional votes are cast. 
In our analysis for this chapter we introduce what we take to be an additional 
innovation. We distinguish between two different ways in which gains to small par-
ties can be measured. At ﬁrst-take, one might presume that gains should be 
thought of relative to total votes cast – absolute gains – but, for individual small op-
position parties, what would surely matter are gains or losses relative to votes won 
by that party at the most recent national election – relative gains. A party that gains 
2 percent of the total vote might not seem to be gaining much and, in absolute terms, 
it is not. But, if that gain doubles its vote-share this would, relatively speaking, be 
hugely newsworthy and seen as a big victory by party supporters. 
In the appendix to this chapter, Table B validates the structural expectations we 
get from the second order model. Small non-government parties do gain support both 
because they are small and also because they are not members of the government. 
The separate effects of being small and being in opposition to the government ap-
ply whichever method is used for measuring gains to small parties. However, being 
in opposition and being small are highly correlated, and if one is interested in the 
joint effects of both reasons for party gains it matters whether those gains are mea-
sured absolutely or relative to the size of the small party. When measured in abso-
lute terms, opposition status does not add signiﬁcantly to small party gains over what 
would be seen were the small party to have been a government member. However, 
if gains are measured relatively then small parties gain both because they are small 
and also because they are in opposition.  
Additional analyses included in Table B show that these gains occur mainly at 
the start of the electoral cycle. Indeed effects for small parties at EP elections held 
shortly after national elections are the strongest effects in the table. Such parties gain 
four times more than the absolute proportion of votes they received at their most re-
cent national election – gains that are statistically highly signiﬁcant. 
This is the ﬁrst time, to the best of our knowledge, that a link has been made bet-
ween the structural model of EP election turnout and the second order implications 
for party gains and losses. Because this is an incidental ﬁnding made in the course 
of a hurried preliminary investigation of new data, it is beyond the remit of this chap-
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ter to validate the ﬁnding by seeing wither it can be replicated using data produced 
by previous EP elections. Until such an investigation is conducted we cannot be sure 
about these ﬁndings and must treat them as suggestive. 
 
conclusion 
 
In this chapter we performed a first effort at providing explanatory factors for the 
outcome of these elections. Our reflection started from the established model that 
sees EP elections as second-order elections, and covered two separate dimensions: 
turnout and party support. 
In terms of turnout, our analysis employed the established structural model that 
sees EP turnout conditioned by several factors which are not related in any way to 
the contingencies of political debate related to the EU. And it is here that we found 
a ﬁrst, striking ﬁnding: while the structural model has in general a remarkable pre-
dictive power for EP election turnout, it clearly cannot account for the turnout increase 
seen in these elections. As a result, it has to be recognized that the 2019 EP elections 
might be marking a turning point in this regard: we might be witnessing – for different 
reasons, whose relative importance cannot be rigorously tested here – a turnout in-
crease which might be related to some real politicization of these elections. 
In terms of party support, our ﬁrst tests do not show equally exceptional results. 
The second-order model still applies, with party gains and losses being partly explained 
by a combination of opposition status and small size, in turn interplaying with the 
timing of the EP election – whether it occurs close to the previous national election 
or not. However, our identiﬁcation of structural dynamics that inﬂuence party sup-
port does not go into the detail of what types of small, opposition parties were rewarded 
in these elections. The open questions remains, whether, in the context of structu-
ral dynamics of party support,  there might still have been some EU-wide trend that 
has rewarded parties with speciﬁc policy positions. Some clues that this might be the 
case have already emerged from the results presented in chapter 1 in this book (An-
gelucci and Carrieri 2019); but – more rigorously – this is the key research question 
assessed in the next chapter (Maggini et al. 2019). 
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appendix to chapter 4  
statistical analyses explaining turout at ep elections 
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Table A - OLS regression findings for the structural model of EP election turnout  
(Franklin 2002)
model 1:  
without new 
democracies
model 2:  
with new  
democracies, 
no  
interactions
model 3:  
with new  
democracies 
and  
interactions
model 4:  
as c but with  
dummy for 2019
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
First election  
“boost” 4.92 (2.90) 2.12 (2.37)ns 5.29 (2.94) 3.46 (2.88)ns
Time to next  
national election  
(0-1 proportion 
 of 5 years)*
-6.79 (3.23) -7.31 (3.00) -6.92 (3.28) -7.40 (3.17)
Compulsory  
voting** 37.12 (2.07) 37.30 (2.11) 37.16 (2.10) 37.20 (2.03)
New democracy -14.81 (2.17) -12.44 (3.59) -11.40 (3.48)
New democracy X 
ﬁrst election -8.07 (4.40) -4.37 (4.37)ns
New democracy X 
time to next  
national election
-2.65 (7.89)ns -6.36 (7.68)ns
2019 year 
dummy 8.96 (2.48)
Electoral sequen-
ce (0-1 proportion 
of 9 elections) -4.95 (3.17)ns -5.02 (3.12)ns -4.10 (3.16)ns -10.98 (3.59)
Intercept 52.56 (2.42) 53.12 (2.35) 52.09 (2.44) 55.15 (2.50)
R-squared 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.79
Observations 132 172 172 172
Notes: All coefficients signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, one-tailed, unless marked "ns". 
 * Originally measured in days. 
 ** Compulsory voting coded 1 if in effect and enforced. If abolished, coded as proportion of years left before all pre-re-
form voters have been replaced, starting with ﬁrst election following abolition. If not enforced, coded as for abolition, 
starting with the second EP election at which the country partici pated (see main text for details).
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In Table A, Model 1 corresponds to the model presented in Franklin (2001), though 
with time to the next national parliamentary election coded as a proportion (so that 
coefficient magnitudes are comparable across variables) rather than in months) and 
with established democracies included at every election up to 2019. Model 2 adds 
new democracies (countries acceding to the EU in 2014 with the exception of Mal-
ta and Cyprus, which were already included in Model 1). Model 3 adds interactions 
between new democracy and each of ﬁrst election and time to next election. These 
show new democracies turning out at an even lower rate 2.9 percent lower than esta-
blished democracies would have done in the absence of a ﬁrst election boost (5.29 
- 8.07 = -2.78), though the difference would not have been statistically signiﬁcant. 
It also shows new democracies being more strongly affected (over a third more stron-
gly) by time to the next election (-6.92 / -2.65 = 0.38), but again this difference would 
not have been statistically signiﬁcant. This is the model used to derive predicted out-
comes for Figures 1 and 2 in the main text. Finally, Model 4 inroduces the 2019 elec-
tion year dummy, mentioned in the main text. The effect of this variable shows tur-
nout in 2019 to have been almost 9 percent greater than would have been expected 
on the basis of the structural model (which would have led us to expect the turnout 
level shown in Figure 2 in the main text. This effect is highly signiﬁcant, statistical-
ly. Indeed, there is less than a 1 in a thousand chance of this effect being the result 
of happenstance. 
Importantly, all of these models except for the ﬁnal one show no signiﬁcant effect 
of electoral sequence – a measure of the location of each election in a nine election 
sequence coded 0 to 1. The effect (leaving aside Model 4) suggests a total drop in 
turnout of 5 percent. This is the fall in turnout not accounted for by contextual chan-
ges, a little more than half of one percent per EP election – rather less than the de-
cline that would have been expected on the basis of work by Franklin and Hobolt 
(2011). It is possible that, far from a reduction in EP election support over the ye-
ars, there has actually been an increase, net of contextual and other factors. 
In Table B we show effects on party gains in vote share between national and EP 
elections, using both types of measure (overall and relative) mentioned in the main 
text. These different measures are presented in pairs of columns for different ana-
lyses. The explanatory power of second order theory is seen there to be very low, espe-
cially when it comes to relative gains, meaning that much of the ﬂuctuation in par-
ty support between national elections and following EP elections is due to other fac-
tors than those that the theory takes into account, or are random in nature. Becau-
se effects are so small we set the bar for statistical signiﬁcance at 0.1 rather than the 
more conventional 0.05. 
The ﬁrst four columns show effects of small party size and opposition status, each 
taken alone. Size has about ten times the apparent effect of opposition status and 
the relative measure shows close to ten times the apparent effect produced by the 
absolute measure. These four coefficients are highly signiﬁcant, statistically. However, 
size and opposition status are also highly correlated, and share explanatory power. 
When we take the two together in Model 3 we ﬁnd that, from both perspectives, op-
position status loses statistical signiﬁcance (and, indeed, acquires the wrong sign when 
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measured from a relative perspective). The two measures also tell different stories 
in the ﬁnal pair of columns, those for Model 4. There we see that the proportion of 
time left to the next election plays an important role in conditioning the strength of 
relative effects, but not of absolute effects. Relative effects of opposition status are 
signiﬁcant in this model even though small party size is also taken into account. In 
explaining the outcome
Table B - Relative and absolute gains from opposition status and small party size,  
OLS regressions
outcome: 
gain in 
vote share
model 1:  
opposition  
status
model 2:  
small party 
size
model 3:  
both together
model 4:  
small party  
size x time
Overall Relative Overall Relative Overall Relative Overall Relative
Opposition  
status
0.03 0.57 -0.34 -0.34
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01)ns (0.22)ns (0.01)ns (0.22)
Small party 
size*
0.27 2.59  0.28  1.99  0.26  0.03
(0.03) (0.76) (0.04) (0.85) (0.06) (1.48)ns
Time left until 
the next  
national 
election  
(proportion)
0.01 0.76
(0.02)ns (0.40)
Small X time  0.04  4.44
(0.12) (2.86)
Intercept -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 =0.03 -0.12 -0.02 0.24
(0.00) (0.09)ns (0.00) (0.11)ns (0.00) (0.11)ns (0.01) (0.22)ns
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.06
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267
Notes: All coefficients signiﬁcant at 0.1, one-tailed, unless marked “ns.” Standard errors in parentheses. 
* 1 - size of party at the most recent national election, measured as a proportion of total votes cast.
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this model, effects of small size become signiﬁcant in the expected direction only pro-
vided there is a long time left before the next national election. More importantly 
this effect is the most powerful of any seen in Table 1. At EP elections held close to 
the start of a country's election cycle, the smallest parties gain by a factor that is four 
times their size, though this boost explains little variance because the smallest par-
ties are few in number and rarely have the good fortune to contest an EP election in 
the immediate aftermath of a national election.  
This last model is suggestive of a strong link between the structural theory and 
second order theory, which should not surprise us since the structural theory itself 
incorporates second order theory in a number of ways. However, the ﬁndings are ba-
sed on models with little power and we should bear in mind the relatively high pro-
bability (little less than 1 in 10) that these ﬁndings are spurious. Evidently they need 
to be conﬁrmed in future research.  
 
 
